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state law." As to the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act, the court held that by
expressly recognizing the right of an employee to join a union the statute
also "impliedly" grants to that employee the right not to join. In consequence, it would be unlawful for an employer to force his employees to
join a union under state law. ' ' This, held the Supreme Court, was the
unlawful object.
Although the injunction entered in the Hagen case had the effect of
stopping the picketing, it also had the effect of making the defendant union
cease attempting to generate a labor-management dispute where one did
not exist; the picketing was an incidental rather than a primary feature of
the case. There was no dispute here in the real sense inasmuch as none
of the plaintiff's employees were members of the defendant union. To force
these employees to join the union would have been unlawful under state
law. We could speculate that the union would have prevailed in this
case had even one of the plaintiff's employees belonged to the union
and refused to cross the picket line. Then there would have been a real
labor dispute, the protective provisions of the Little Norris-LaGuaria Act
26
would have applied, and no injunction could have been issued.
In conclusion, states still retain important jurisdiction where labormanagement disputes exist, or where they do not exist andan "outside
union" tries to generate one. If a "pattern of violence" can be established
by a plaintiff seeking an injunction against mass picketing, state courts
have jurisdiction.
Further, under existing 'Wyoming statutes, picketing
may be injoined where no real labor dispute exists on the theory that an
employer cannot and should not declare that hereafter he will maintain a
"closed shop," thereby forcing his employees to join a union. Organized
labor will always be able to strike and picket if it (toes so peacefully.
Where a labor dispute exists, if an employer has reason to believe that
the pickets will become violent, and a state of tension exists, it is within
his right to seek a state court injunction to prevent violence, but not to
stop the picketing. State courts need not be apologetic when called upon to
decide questions in these areas.
D. THOMAS KIDD

LOSS OF NATIONALITY BY SERVICE IN A FOREIGN ARMY
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that by the voluntary commission of certain insignificant acts they could forfeit one of their most
precious rights, their citizenship. Prior to 1907, the Department of State
had authority to determine what constituted intentional renunciation of
citizenship. 1 However, in that year, Congress specified three acts which,
25.
26.

Supra note 21.
The Little Norris-LaGuardia Act was raised as a defense in the answer in the
Bucknarn case, but both the District Court and the Supreme Court seem to have

ignored it.
1.

1943 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 2886.

NoTEs

it voluntarily performed, would result in expatriation." They were: marriage by all American woman to a foreign national, taking an oath of
allegiance to a foreign country, and accepting naturalization in a foreign
country. Subsequent legislation3 has increased the list of acts so that a
revised enumeration would include:
Naturalization in a foreign state.
Declaration of allegiance to a foreign state.
Entering or serving in foreign armed services.
Service under a foreign government in an official capacity.
Voting in a foreign political election.
Renunciation of American citizenship.
Conviction for certain acts (e.g., treason, attempt to overthrow
the United States by force.)
(h)Evasion of military service.4
(i) Desertion in time of war.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

In the principal case, Nishikawa v. Dulles,5 petitioner was a native-born
citizen of the United States, and because of the citizenship of his parents
he was also considered by Japan to be a citizen of that country.6 In 1939,
he went to Japan intending to stay between two and five years studying
and visiting. Two years later, he was conscripted into the Japanse Army
and served in the war against the United States. After the war he applied
for an American passport but was given instead a certificate of loss of
nationality. Petitioner sued for a judgment declaring him to be a citizen
of the United States. At the trial, Nishikawa testified that he had heard
rumors about the brutality of the Japanese secret police which made him
afraid to protest. The only affirmative evidence introduced by the government was that petitioner went to Japan at a time when he was subject to
conscription. Judgment was issued against him and affirmed by the
Circuit Court 6f Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 7 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held that the evidence was not sufficent to establish petitioner's loss of
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2534, §§ 2, 3, 4, 34 Stat. 1228. Sections 3, 4 repealed Sept.
22, 1922, c. 41, §§ 6, 7, 42 Stat. 1022, § 2 repealed and superseded by Nationality
Act of 1940, c. 876, § 504, 54 Stat. 1172, 8 U.S.C. § 904 (1940 ed.). The Cable Act,
c. 411, 42 Stat. 1022 (1922) although repealing the sections of the old act dealing
with the loss of citizenship by marriage, provided that any woman citizen who
marries an alien ineligible for citizenship (i.e., Chinese) shall cease to be a citizen.
This piece of discriminatory legislation was repealed in 1931 so that today marriage
per se in no case effects loss of nationality. Act of March 3, 1933, c. 422, § 4, 46
Stat. 155.
Nationality Act of 1940, c. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1940 ed.)
superseded by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, c. 477, § 349, 66 Stat. 267,
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952 ed.).
One ground, desertion, has been declared unconstitutional as applied in the
Nationality Act of 1940 on the grounds that expatriation for the military crime of
desertion is "cruel and unusual punishment" and therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78
It would appear that an identical objection
S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958).
could be made to the same provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, c. 477, § 349, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C, § 1481 (a) (8) (1952 ed.).
356 U.S. 129, 78 S.Ct. 612, 2 L.Ed.2d 659 (1958).
The present provision, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, c. 477, § 349 (a) (3),
66 Stat. 267, 268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (3) eliminates the necessity that the expatriate
have or acquire the nationality of the foreign state in order to be expatriated by
joining a foreign army.
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1957).
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citizenship under Section' ,101 (c) of the Nationality Act of 19408 as a
result of his entering and serving in the armed forces of a foreign country.
(Nishikawa went into the service when the 1910 Act was in effect.)

The

government had not sustained the burden of establishing the voluntary
conduct which is an essential ingredient of expatriation.9
What is the nature of the status that the government was insisting
the plaintiff had forfeited? Perhaps citizenship can be understood best
by a consideration of its antonym, alienage. The alien while residing in
our country enjoys substantially the same protection available to citizens.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that:
While he lawfully remains here, he is entitled to the benefits
of the guaranties of life, liberty and property secured by the Constitution to all persons, of whatever race, within the jurisdiction
of the United States.

His personal rights . . . are as fully pro-

tected as if he were a native or naturalized citizen of the United
States.' 0
The major difference would appear to be
permanent protection by the government.
to withdraw its hospitality from the alien,
of his origin or any other place that will
seem to be valuable.

that an alien is not entitled to
When the government decides
he can be deported to the land
accept him. Citizenship would

What persons are entitled to citizenship? The English view was that
all persons born within the allegiance, or in other words, under the
protection and control of the Crown, were natural-born British subjects.',
As might be expected, a similar rule was judicially adopted in the United
States,' 2 as least as far as white persons were concerned,'-" and was in force
until adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.1 4 This bill, designed to
extend citizenship to Negroes, declared that "all persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed, are declared to be citizens.... " This act and its constitutional
counterpart, the Fourteenth Amendment,' 5 established the rule which
controls the acquisition of citizenship by birth within the country at the
present time. Naturalized citizens and children born abroad of American
nationals receive their citizenship by virtue of the Naturalization Power. t 6
ed.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

By whatever means acquired, citizenship definitely may be relinquishIn order to divest oneself of nationality at Common Law, it was
Nationality Act of 1940, c. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1940 ed.)
superseded by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, c. 477, § 349, 66 Stat.
267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (19.52 ed.).
Nishikawa v. Dullcs, 356 U.S. 129, 137. 78 S.Ct. 612, 617, 2 L.Ed.2d 659, 666 (1958).
Lem Moon Sing v. United States. 158 U.S. 538, 547, 15 S.Ct. 967, 971, 39 L.Ed.
1082, 1085 (1895).
Calvins Case 7 Co.Rep. I, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b, 70 Eng.Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 155, 7 L.Ed. 617, 637 (1830); United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 674, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856).
Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
U.S. Cont. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

NOTES

necessary to have consent of the sovereign.1 7 However, in 1868, Congress
gave statutory recognition to voluntary expatriation.' 8 Congress declared
that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all
people .... " The right of expatriation has been extended subsequently
so that any of the aforementioned acts, i.e., joining a foreign army, taking
an oath of allegiance, etc., will denationalize a citizen regardless of the
absence of a specific intent to lose citizenship t" or ignorance of the consequences20 so long as the act is voluntary.
The constitutionality of taking away citizenship for service in a
foreign army is not entirely clear. The Supreme Court in the recent case of
Perez v. Brownell 21 upheld the constitutionality of Section 401 (e) of the
Nationality Act of 194022 which provides that "a person who is a national
. . . shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state...." The Court first pointed that Congress has the inherent
power to deal with foreign affairs as an attribute of sovereignty. Then
the opinion stated that the constitutional test was whether expatriation
bore a reasonable relationship to the regulation of foreign affairs. The
Court found that voting by an American in a foreign election might be a
source of embarrassment to our government and was therefore regulable
under the foreign affairs power. In order to avoid this embarrassment
Congress took what it regarded as a reasonable method of solving the
problem in summary fashion. By reaffirming the inhert power doctrine
and applying it specifically to this field the Court has ended the confusion
existing because of its previous unwillingness to confront the problem of
23
Constitutional authority for Congressional expariation.
However, the test applied by the Court in the Perez case 2 4 has never
been used in a Supreme Court decision dealing with loss of nationality
because of service in a foreign army. In accordance with the Court's policy
of judicial restraint in deciding constitutional questions, the problem was
not discussed, at least by the majority, in the principal case, as it could be
disposed of on other grounds.2 r Nevertheless, the rationale of the Perez
decision would seem to be equally pertinent to this situation, as American
participation in foreign military ventures has been an acute source of
embarrassment to our nation. Expatriation indicates disapproval by our
government of adventurers who involve our country in difficult situations,
and would deter others from taking a similar course. Therefore, by the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 7 L.Ed. 666 (1830).
Act of July 27, 1868, c. 249, § 1, 15 Stat. 223.
Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952; Devedin v. Acheson, 194 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1952).
Scavone v. Acheson, 103 F.Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y., 1952); Acheson v. Mariko Kuniyuki,
190 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1951).
356 U.S. 44, 78 S.Ct. 568, 2 L.Ed.2d 603 (1958).
Nationality Act of 1940, c. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1940 ed.)
superseded by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, c. 477, § 349, 66 Stat. 267,
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952 ed.).
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 36 S.Ct. 106, 60 L.Ed. 297 (1915).
Supra note 20.
356 U.S. 129, 78 S.Ct. 612, 2 L.Ed.2d 659 (1958).
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criteria established by the Perez case, it is submitted that the section will
probably be held constitutional if the issue arises.

The Nishikawa case introduces another problem, however, as to who
bears the burden of proof during succeeding stages of the trial. In a
Per Curiam decision, Gonzales v. Landon,2 6 the Court had held that the
27
standard proof required of the government -in denaturalization cases
Was applicable to expatriation cases arising under Section 401 (j) of the
Nationality Act of 1940. In the Nishikawa case, the Court concluded that
the same rule should govern cases under all subsections of Section 401.
When the citizenship claimant proves his birth in this country or the
acquisition of American citizenship in some other way, "the burden is
upon the Government to prove an act that shows expatriation by clear,
convincing and unequivocal evidence." 2 8 A mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. In the Schneidermnan9 and Baumgartner ° denaturalization cases where the burden of proof rule was applied to loss of
citizenship cases, the government was trying to revoke certificates of naturalization on the grounds of illegal and fraudulent procurement because of
statements made at the time of the oath of allegiance. The exacting
standard required by the Supreme Court was not met and the government
lost both cases because the evidence failed to show with the requisite
degree of certainty that during the period in question the defendant was
not attached to the principles of the Constitution.3 1
Yet, in the cases involving expatriation, the task of proving by clear
and unequivocal evidence that an expatriation act has occurred would not
seem to be so formidable. The government under which the citizenship
claimant had served in a civilian or military capacity or had taken an oath
of allegiance would presumably have records available which could aid
the United States in the preparation of its case.
However, the decision has imposed an additional and much more
onerous burden of proof upon the government. The statute requires that
the expatriating act be voluntar; .32 The govcrnment argued that duress
is a matter of affirmative defense and contended that the party claiming
that he acted involuntarily must overcome a presumption of voluntariness.33 The Court held that because the consequences of denationalization
are so drastic, the law should be construed in favor of the citizen and
26.

350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210. 100 L.Ed. 806 (1955).

27.

Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943).

28.

Nishiwawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133, 78 S.Ct. 612, 615, 2 L.Ed.2d 659, 663 (1958).

29.

320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 LEd. 1796 (1943).

30.
31.

322 U.S. 655, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944).
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 667, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 1246, 88 L.Ed. 1525,
1533 (1944) ; Schneidermann v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1342,
87 L.Ed. 1796, 1807.
Nationality Act of 1940, c. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1940 ed.)

32.

superseded by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, c. 477, § 349, 66 Stat.
33.

267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952 ed.).
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134, 78 S.Ct. 612, 616, 2 L.Ed.2d 659, 664 (1958)

NOTES

placed upon the government the burden of proving voluntariness. 34 Once
the petitioner can show that coercion existed to any degree so as to raise
the issue of durees, it is incumbent upon the United States to prove the
expatriating act was voluntary.
Voluntariness is, to a certain extent, a subjective state of mind and
poses problems similar to specific intent in first degree murder. Furthermore, the difficulty of obtaining from a foreign country after years have
elapsed proof of surrounding circumstances existent at the time of the
act complained of, makes the evidentiary problems practically insolvable,
and seriously limits the effectiveness of the statute.
Presumably the rule announced by the Nishikawa case 35 will be applied
to the present nationality act, although the more recent statute contains a
provision that if such person was a national at the time of the act and had
been present in such state for ten years, it is presumed that the act was
36
voluntary.
To conclude, the Perez case has largely solved the constitutional
difficulties of Congressional expatriation by squarely placing such legislation within the power to regulate foreign affairs, which in turn is based
upon the sovereignity of the central government as a nation. The Court,
in the Nishikawa case, has established a very fair burden of proof, at least
as far as citizenship claimants are concerned. And yet, the remedy does not
meet the problem as the Perez case has outlined it. It is at least arguable
that expatriation many years after the expatriation act was committed in
no way operates to molify our sensitive neighbors. The punishment for
service in a foreign army exceeds the gravity of such an offense. Perhaps
a more effective and equitable solution would be a demand by our
government that the offender return to his homeland or cease the objectionable action within a reasonable period of time, or else suffer the penalty
of expatriation. This procedure would imposed a greater burden on the
State Department in these cases but would evoke a greater degree of
judicial sympathy and cooperation with the enforcement of the act, and
indicate just as clearly the disapprobation of the government. However,
Congress has resisted efforts to relax the existing provisions.
Although the test of constitutionality announced by the Court has
never been applied to expatriation for service in a foreign army, there is
little doubt that the same rationale is equally in point and that the
particular provision in both the 1940 act and the more recent enactment
will be upheld.
JAMES DALEY
34.
35.
36.

Ibid.
356 U.S. 129, 78 S.Ct. 612, 2 L.Ed.2d 659 (1958).
Supra note 32.

